Ocean and Coastal Law Journal
Volume 17 | Number 1

Article 5

2011

The Imia Islets: A Beginning To The Maritime
Delimitation Of The Aegean Sea Dispute
Emily A. Georgiades, Barrister

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/oclj
Recommended Citation
Emily A. Georgiades, Barrister, The Imia Islets: A Beginning To The Maritime Delimitation Of The Aegean Sea Dispute, 17 Ocean &
Coastal L.J. (2011).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/oclj/vol17/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Ocean and Coastal Law Journal by an authorized administrator of University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu.

THE IMIA ISLETS: A BEGINNING TO THE
MARITIME DELIMITATION
OF THE AEGEAN SEA DISPUTE
Emily A. Georgiades, Barrister∗

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Greece and Turkey have each
been vying for territory within their common waters in the Aegean Sea.
For over five decades, the two governments have contested the territorial
sovereignty of the two rocky islets of Imia, the delimitation of the
continental shelf and the territorial sea, and whether the continental shelf
is a natural prolongation of Greece or Turkey’s mainland coast.1 Not
surprisingly then, the two countries have disagreed on where to draw the
respective border in the Aegean Sea2 and, perhaps more fundamentally,
on the application of certain practices under international law.3
The Aegean Sea is itself unique being 400 miles long and 200 miles
wide, with thousands of islands scattered throughout it.4 Of particular
importance are the Imia rocks and islets, which are scattered
approximately 4 miles off Turkey’s west mainland coast, in the southeast

* Barrister-at-Law of the Honorable Society of Lincoln’s Inn, New York State
licensed attorney, License at Law (Cyprus), M.A. International Boundary Law
(University of Durham), LL.M. (Fordham Law School), G.D.L. (The College of Law),
B.A. (Fordham College). This Article is an adaptation of the research work Barrister
Georgiades conducted at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg,
Germany, during an attachment in 2006-2007. Ms. Georgiades may be contacted at
e.georgiades@hotmail.co.uk.
1. See infra Part III.
2. See id.
3. For example, Turkey remains a persistent objector to the extension of territorial
waters up to twelve nautical miles. See BORDER AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 47 (Alan J.
Day ed., 2d ed. 1987).
4. Aegean Sea, COLUMBIA ELECTRONIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://print.infoplease.com/
ce6/world/A0802591.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2012).
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Aegean Sea,5 and are also approximately 2.3 nautical miles from the
Turkish island of Cavus.6 The islets are approximately 6 nautical miles
east of the Greek island of Kalymnos, 1.9 miles southeast of the Greek
island of Kalolimnos, and 1 mile west of the boundary that divides the
Greek and Turkish territorial sea.7 Being so close to Greek and Turkish
territories, the islands are at the center of the Greek-Turkish dispute.
This Article will examine possible maritime and airspace
delimitations through the application of international law, including
customary law and bi- and multi-lateral conventions. Part II begins with
a brief discussion of the historical background that has shaped GreekTurkish relations and led to the present-day dispute. Part III analyzes
whether Turkey is bound by the provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, and Part IV proposes delimitations of
the maritime zones, while specifically discussing the Imia islets and
whether they are juridical islands capable of generating any maritime
zones. Part V provides possible territorial sea delimitations to the entire
Aegean Sea, while Part VI discusses the relation between the territorial
sea regime and the airspace above it. Lastly, Part VII outlines methods
to delimit the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone areas in the
entire Aegean Sea before concluding with a discussion on various
dispute resolution methods that Greece and Turkey may consider to
resolve their long-standing issues in the Aegean.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CURRENT CLAIMS
Although the dispute concerning the Aegean Sea stems largely from
Greece’s acquisition of the territory in the first half of the twentieth
century,8 the dispute is rooted in a deep history of political incidents that
have added to the tension between Greece and Turkey.

5. Krateros Ioannon, A Tale of Two Islets: The Imia Incident Between Greece and
Turkey, 1 THESIS 33, 35 (1997), available at http://www.hri.org/MFA/thesis/spring97/
two_islets.html.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. The modern Greek state’s acquisition of Aegean territory occurred in two phases:
The first taking place after World War I, with the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923,
after which Greece claimed sovereign rights to the Imia islets. BORDER AND TERRITORIAL
DISPUTES, supra note 3, at 45. The second occurred after World War II, when Greece
acquired the Dodecanese Islands from Italy through the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty.
Id.
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Turkey has frequently challenged Greece’s territorial claims in the
Aegean Sea. For example, in 1931, Turkey de facto9 questioned
Greece’s ten nautical mile airspace for the first time.10 Although
Turkey’s official maps began to depict the Imia islets as Greek territory
in the 1960s, in 1964 Turkey unilaterally denounced the 1930
Convention of the Establishment of Commerce and Navigation, an
agreement devised by then-Turkish President Kemal Ataturk and thenGreek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos.11 During 1973 and 1974,
Turkey de facto questioned Greece’s sovereign rights over the Aegean
continental shelf when the Turkish government granted research licenses
to the Turkish state petroleum company and sent the research vessel
Cardali to conduct research in the area.12 In 1974, Turkey again de facto
questioned Greece’s ten nautical mile airspace.13 Tensions continued to
rise when Turkey claimed that if Greece extended its territorial waters to
twelve nautical miles, then Turkey would consider such an action a casus
belli.14
It was not until 1976 that Turkey and Greece agreed to refer the
continental shelf dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), after
which the dispute became known as the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf
case.15 However, Turkey did not attend the hearing and did not submit a
counter-memorial, claiming that both parties were still in the negotiating
stage.16 The ICJ examined whether it had jurisdiction to hear the case
and concluded that it did not have jurisdiction with respect to the
9. In the legal context, de facto means “having effect even though not formally or
legally recognized.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 183 (2d ed. 2001).
10. Greece has fixed the lateral limits of its territorial waters in two different ways: a
six-mile territorial sea, for general purposes, and a ten-mile territorial sea, established by
decree in 1931 for aviation and air-policing purposes. Greece's Positions on National
Airspace and Territorial Waters, EMBASSY OF GREECE (Jan. 18, 2012),
http://www.greekembassy.org/embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=45&art
icle=80.
11. GABRIELLA BLUM, ISLANDS OF AGREEMENT: MANAGING ENDURING ARMED
RIVALRIES 129 (2007).
12. Chronology of Main Turkish Hostile Actions and Arbitrary Claims Against
Greece 1955-1996, HELLENIC RES. NETWORK, http://www.hri.org/MFA/foreign/bilateral/
turchro.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2012).
13. U.N. DIV. FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS & THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICE FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS,
THE LAW OF THE SEA: NATIONAL LEGISLATION ON THE TERRITORIAL SEA, THE RIGHT OF
INNOCENT PASSAGE AND THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE, at 142, U.N. Sales No. E.95.V7 (1995).
14. Cansu Camlibel, Solve It or See You in Court, Greece Says, TURKISH DAILY
NEWS, Mar. 27, 2011, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=either-a-solution-orthe-court-greece-urges-turkey-on-aegean-2011-03-26.
15. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. 3 (Aug. 10).
16. Id. at 8, ¶ 14.
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delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea between Greece
and Turkey because: (1) the parties did not agree as to the method of
dispute resolution; and (2) when Turkey acceded to the General Act of
1928, it included a reservation stating that the disputes relating to
Greece’s territorial status, among other things, will be excluded from the
procedures of the General Act.17 The reservation also stated that any
disputes relating to international law issues would be solely within the
domestic jurisdiction of the states.18 The ICJ did, however, find that a
boundary delimitation dispute of the Aegean Sea continental shelf
exists,19 thus validating the that fact both parties have legal claims which
need to be resolved either through negotiations or adjudication.
Today, Greece and Turkey are asserting legal claims to the Aegean
Sea. Both nations are contesting the breadth of the delimitation of their
respective maritime zones and airspaces in the Aegean Sea and both are
claiming ownership of the Imia islets. These claims are interrelated;
determining ownership of the Imia may impact the extent of their borders
in the Aegean Sea.
III. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW V. TREATY ACCESSION: IS
TURKEY BOUND?
The first issue in addressing the validity of each party’s claim is
determining the applicable international law. Although there are various
principles of international law that guide boundary delimitation cases, the
most accepted doctrine is codified in the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS or the Convention). However, while
Greece has ratified UNCLOS, Turkey is not a signatory party and
opposes the Convention; therefore, the Convention itself is not binding
upon the parties.20 Accordingly, the issue becomes whether the
principles adopted in the Convention have achieved customary status
under international law and can therefore be considered erga omnes in
nature.
Customary law consists of customs that are accepted as legal
requirements or obligatory rules of conduct.21 Determining whether a
17. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), Jurisdiction of the Court, 1978
I.C.J. 46, ¶ 109 (Dec. 19).
18. Id. at 23, ¶ 55.
19. Id. at 23, ¶ 31; Id. at 46-49 (separate opinion of Vice President Nagendra Singh).
20. Peter Prows, Tough Love: The Dramatic Birth and Looming Demise of UNCLOS
Property Law (and What Is to Be Done About It), 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 241, 246 n.19
(2007).
21. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 169 (2d ed. 2001).

2011]

The Imia Islets

107

certain practice has attained customary international law status is
difficult because “[p]roof of customary law, like proof of title to
territory, is relative, not absolute.”22 While there is no single feature that
is dispositive on such an analysis, generally, for principles to be
established as customary international law, they must be established “by
virtue of a pattern of claim, absence of protest by states particularly
interested in the matter at hand and acquiescence by other states.”23 In
addition, judicial decisions and state legislative acts are other ways of
achieving the status of customary international law.24 Treaties also are
capable of contributing to the formation of a customary rule because they
are manifestations of the conduct of states; as such, they contribute to
opinio juris.25 The utilization of rules and practices by international
bodies, such as the ICJ, further supports a claim that such rules have
become customary under international law.26
UNCLOS merely codified rules that were already in practice.27 The
fact that 162 states ratified UNCLOS28 signifies a general accord for its
rules and principles. Moreover, the preamble of UNCLOS states in part
that its goal is to “develop the principles embodied in Resolution 2749
(XXV) of 17 December 1970 and that it is believed that this Convention
achieves ‘the codification and progressive development of the law of the
sea.”’29 Thus, it is submitted that these rules are customary international
law codified under UNCLOS.
However, because Turkey has opposed the Convention, another issue
that is raised is whether a state can prevent the formation of customary
law. In the South West Africa cases, Judge Tanka stated “that a few
dissenting States could not prevent the formation of a customary
international rule, but this implies nonetheless that a very large majority
22. THE CHALLENGE OF CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL LAW RESPONDS 427 (Ustinia
Dolgopol & Judith Gail Gardam, eds., 2006).
23. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 84 (2003).
24. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON
STATE RESPONSIBILITY 94 (2002).
25. Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L., 757, 758 (2001).
26. Id. at 775.
27. See SHAW, supra note 23, at 491-92.
28. U.N. Div. for Ocean Affairs & the Law of the Sea, Chronological Lists of
Ratifications of, Accession and Successions to the Convention and the Related Agreements as
at 03 June 2011, UN.ORG, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_
lists_of_ratifications.htm#The%20United%20Nations%20Convention%20on%20the%20Law
%20of%20the%20Sea (last updated June 3, 2011).
29. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
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is required.”30 Similarly, Professor Akehurst asserts that “[t]he number
of States needed to create a rule of customary law varies according to the
amount of practice which conflicts with the rule.”31 Article 38(1)(b) of
the International Court’s Statute, which refers to customary international
law as being established by state practice and opinio juris, speaks of a
general practice and not of a universal practice.32 Therefore, if a few
states dissent to a particular practice then that practice may still become
customary international law because it is a general practice—not all
states have to accept the practice.33 Turkey’s dissenting to Greece’s
practices does not mean that the practices have not gained customary
international law; rather, these practices are customary international law
because they are practiced generally by a majority of states.
A similar issue also arises out of Turkey’s non-acquiescence to
UNCLOS: can a state be bound by customary international law if the
state does not prescribe to it? According to Professor Akehurst, “[a]
State can be bound by a rule of customary law even if it has never
consented to that rule.”34 However, the caveat is that for the rule to be
binding on a state, the state must not have objected to the rule ab initio;35
by not objecting at the first opportunity when an objection should be
made, a state acquiesces.36 This first opportunity to object has great
significance because it is the moment at which the state’s legal rights are
either being preserved through objection or changed by silence.37
According to Villiger, a state is not bound by a customary rule if it
fulfills two conditions: (1) the state must have maintained its objections
from early stages of the rule onwards, through its formation, and beyond;
and (2) the objections must be maintained consistently.38 Notably, once

30. Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, in SOURCES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 267 (Marti Koskenniemi ed., 2000).
31. Id. at 268.
32. According to Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice:
“[t]he Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply . . . international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law . . . .” Statute of the International Court of Justice, art.
38, para. 1.
33. See id.
34. Akehurst, supra note 30, at 273.
35. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18).
36. SHAW, supra note 23, at 437.
37. Id.
38. MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A MANUAL
ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES 34 (1997).
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a rule of customary international law becomes binding on a state, the
state cannot release itself from its obligations unilaterally.39
In the present case, for approximately fifty years since the signing of
the Paris Peace Treaty with Italy, Turkey has not protested the twelve
nautical mile rule. Although Turkey may have objected to the twelve
nautical mile rule for territorial sea zones at the inception of the rule, it
has not maintained its objection. Evidence of this may be found in
Turkey’s delimiting its territorial waters and continental shelf in the
Black Sea with Bulgaria and other countries in accordance with
UNCLOS principles.40 Turkey may argue that its agreement with
Bulgaria was simply a negotiation or a political agreement; however, it is
still an agreement that carries legal implications and is based on
international legal norms. Furthermore, there is no rule that conflicts
with the twelve nautical mile rule for territorial sea delimitation. Thus,
Turkey is not exempt from UNCLOS.
IV. MARITIME TERRITORY: ANALYSIS AND DELIMITATION
Having established that the principles expounded by UNCLOS are
applicable in the Greek-Turkish dispute, the next step is to analyze the
respective claims in the context of the maritime zones outlined in the
Convention.
The maritime zones include the territorial sea, the continental shelf,
and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).41 The territorial sea is a zone of
sovereignty and is the area of water that is closest to a state’s coastline.42
It extends to a maximum breadth of twelve nautical miles.43 In turn, the
continental shelf is comprised of the seabed and subsoil, beyond the
territorial sea, that projects from the continental landmass into the sea
and eventually falls away into the ocean’s depths.44 The continental
shelf extends to the outer edge of the continental margin or to a
39. Id. at 261.
40. Turkey extended its territorial waters in the Black Sea to twelve nautical miles.
Territorial Sea: Casus belli, HELLENIC REPUBLIC MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
http://www1.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/relevant-documents/territorialsea-casus-belli.html (last updated Mar. 3, 2011). Turkey and Bulgaria delimited their
maritime zones in the Black Sea by using the equidistance method of demarcation.
NUGZAR DUNDUA, DELIMITATION OF MARITIME BOUNDARIES BETWEEN ADJACENT STATES
30 (2006-2007).
41. UNCLOS, supra note 29, pts. II, IV, V.
42. Id. art. 3.
43. Id.
44. Id. art. 76(1).
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maximum distance of 200 nautical miles.45 It is an area which is
typically rich in oil and gas and abundant in fish.46 Lastly, the EEZ is the
area beyond, and adjacent to, the territorial sea that provides the coastal
state sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage its
natural resources, as well as a right to conduct marine scientific
research.47 Like the continental shelf, the EEZ begins from the outer
limit of the territorial sea and has a maximum breadth of 200 nautical
miles.48 Notably, islands that are naturally formed areas of land,
surrounded by water, and above water at high tide, are capable of
generating their own territorial seas.49
Although there is no bright-line rule that delimits these zones—
because the facts of each dispute are different, each dispute requires
case-by-case analysis—UNCLOS does provide guidelines.50
The
Convention provides that principles of equity,51 proportionality,52 natural
prolongation, 53 and non-encroachment,54 as well as the consideration of
other relevant circumstances, including geographic size and location, be
taken into consideration.55
45. Id.
46. SHAW, supra note 23, at 521.
47. UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 56.
48. Id. art. 57.
49. Id. art. 121.
50. Such guidelines are for drawing closing lines for the delimitation of internal
waters of archipelagic states, id. art. 50, normal baselines, id. art. 5, straight baselines, id.
art. 7, determining a combination of methods for drawing baselines, id. art. 14, delimiting
the territorial sea between states, id. art. 15, delimiting the EEZ between opposite and
adjacent states, id. art. 84, and delimiting the continental shelf between opposite and
adjacent states, id. art. 86.
51. Tribunals and courts have used the principle of equity as a means of mitigating
inequities between the parties. SHAW, supra note 23, at 103.
52. “Proportionality” refers to the length of relevant coasts of each party; it is this
ratio that can be used to apportion the size of each maritime zone. See Fisheries Case
(U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18).
53. The term “natural prolongation” refers to the area of continental shelf which
extends from a country’s land territory into and under the sea. See Continental Shelf,
1969 I.C.J. 3, 22 (Feb. 20). It is an extension of a State’s landmass and provides the State
with an inherent right to explore the seabed and exploit its natural resources. Id.
54. The principle of non-encroachment is embodied in Article 7(6) of UNCLOS,
which states that no state can use a system of straight baselines “in such a manner as to
cut off the territorial sea of another state from the high seas or an exclusive economic
zone.” UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 7.
55. In relation to the continental shelf, the Court determined in the North Sea
Continental Shelf cases, that
delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles,
and taking account of all relevant circumstances, in such a way as to leave as much
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As a matter of law, there are several options available in delimiting a
maritime boundary, including a continental shelf and EEZ boundary line
of opposite and adjacent states. Accordingly, a delimitation of only the
territorial sea around the Imia islets should be proposed for this area,
while the continental shelf and EEZ delimitation can be done for the
entire Aegean Sea region.
A. Possible Delimitation of the Maritme Zones of the Imia Islets
The delimitation of the area between the Imia islets and the Turkish
coastline should be done in light of applicable UNCLOS articles and
relevant circumstances (e.g., proximity to the Turkish coastline and the
neighboring island of Cavus, and the relative sizes of the coastlines and
other neighboring islands).56 Accordingly:
[N]either of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between
them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the
median line of every point which is equidistant from the nearest
points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
seas of each of the two States is measured.57
Thus, a median line is drawn midway between Cavus and Imia and
between Imia and the Turkish mainland coast.
In delimiting the area around the Imia islets, the principle of nonencroachment should be considered because of the Imia’s close

as possible to each party all those parts of the continental shelf that constitute a
natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea, without
encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land territory of others.
Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 54 (Feb. 20). In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case,
the ICJ took into consideration Norway’s unique coastline that was deeply indented by
fjords, sunds (sounds), and by a fringe of islands and rocks (the skaergaard) that are
difficult to separate from the mainland. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116
(Dec. 18). In the Tunisia/Libya case, the ICJ examined the role of proportionality and
considered the disparity of the two states’ coastal lengths to adjust the median line and
attribute a larger continental shelf to Libya. Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), 1985
I.C.J. 13, 48-50 (June 3). In the Cameroon-Nigeria case, the ICJ had to take into
consideration shifting populations, straddling villages, and boundary communities when
deciding how to demarcate a boundary line. See generally Land and Maritime Boundary
Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), 1998 I.C.J. 275 (Mar. 25). Such
considerations are important because the Court has to ensure that the rights and interests
of the local populations are respected. Id. at ¶ 107.
56. ROBIN ROLF CHURCHILL & ALAN VAUGHAN LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 63 (3d
ed. 1983).
57. Id.
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proximity to Turkey and other islands. On their eastern coasts, the Imia
cannot have a continental shelf and an EEZ because these are areas that
extend beyond the territorial sea. However, it may be possible to have
such zones on the southern and western coasts of the Imia in a manner
which would not encroach upon the maritime zones generated by the
islands of Kalymnos and Pserimos.
Presently, there is a median line construction, but if sovereignty of
the Imia were found to belong to Turkey, then the boundary line could
possibly shift to the west. The extent of this shift would depend on how
much effect the islands were given. If the median line construction is
used, then it would be drawn between Kalymnos and the Imia (i.e., on
the west side of the islands). Alternatively, if half-effect is given, then
the line could shift to the west in a manner that would cut less than the
half-way distance between Imia and Kalymnos. This latter option would,
in effect, extend Turkey’s territorial sea by approximately 4-4.2 nautical
miles west of the Turkish mainland coast.
V. DELIMITATING TERRITORIAL WATERS IN THE ENTIRE AEGEAN SEA
REGION
This section will discuss a possible delimitation of the entire Aegean
Sea region, including, but not limited to, the Imia islets. Because the
territorial sea is the zone that begins from a nation’s coast it is logical to
begin the delimitation with this zone and then to delimit the continental
shelf and EEZ. The two legal issues to be examined are: (1) the breadth
of the territorial sea; and (2) the delimitation of the territorial sea.
The first issue to consider when delimitating the territorial waters of
the Aegean Sea is to what extent each state is allowed to extend its
territorial seas in the Aegean. Although, in theory, both Greece and
Turkey have the right to extend their territorial waters to twelve nautical
miles, in practice, this is not feasible due to the close proximity of the
two nations. If each nation extended its territorial waters up to ten
nautical miles, access to the high seas via the northern Turkish coast and
the Turkish straits would be cut off. Therefore, the delimitation of their
territorial seas must be seen in light of this special circumstance.
Professor Van Dyke suggests a possible equitable compromise:
accepting a twelve nautical mile territorial sea from Greece’s coasts, but
not from its islands.58 Van Dyke also suggests another possible
compromise: allow “at least some of Greece’s islands in the Western
58. Jon M. Van Dyke, The Aegean Sea Dispute: Options and Avenues, 20 MARINE
POL’Y 397, 402 (1996).
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Aegean to generate 12 nautical miles zones, while continuing to insist
that the eastern Greek islands limit their territorial seas to 6 nautical
miles.”59 Another proposed solution is based on the 1984 Agreement
between Chile and Argentina, whereby Chile and Argentina “limited
their territorial sea claims in relation to each other to three nautical miles,
but claimed twelve nautical miles of territorial seas with regard to all
other countries.”60
1. The Northern Aegean Sea Sector
Because Turkey and Greece are adjacent states in the northern sector
of the Aegean Sea, the territorial sea boundary line should be constructed
perpendicular to the land frontier at approximately latitude 40° 43.5´
north, longitude 26° 00´ 2.5´´ east, and extend southwest at a distance
halfway between Greece and Turkey and Samothraki Island. Bolukbasi
proposed drawing a mainland-to-mainland boundary line, which would
not give any effect to Thasos or Samothraki except in allowing these
islands to have a six nautical mile territorial sea zone.61 Likewise, he
proposes discounting Bozcaada and Gokceada and not using them for
base points.62 However, because of the relative size of these islands and
the proximity of these Greek and Turkish islands to their respective
mainland, it would be advisable to give them all full effect. Given
Samothraki’s size and relatively close distance to Greece and Turkey,
this island should be given full effect; the perpendicular line should be
drawn mid-way. From this point, the boundary should extend southsouthwest around Gokceada and south-southeast around the island of
Limnos.
2. The Central Aegean Sea Sector
In the central Aegean sector, Bolukbasi’s proposed model includes
apportioning six nautical miles to the Northern Sporades and Skiros
islands, and not giving them any effect in the median-line delimitation.63
The Northern Sporades islands, along with Skianthos, Skopelos, and
59. Id.
60. Id. at 402. See also DENIZ BOLUKBASI, TURKEY AND GREECE: THE AEGEAN
DISPUTES, A UNIQUE CASE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 66 (2004).
61. BOLUKBASI, supra note 60, at 510-12.
62. Id. at 512.
63. TULLIO SCOVAZZI, MARITIME LIMITS AND BOUNDARIES IN THE AEGEAN: SOME
MAPS WITH LEGAL COMMENTARIES, reprinted in AEGEAN ISSUES: PROBLEMS-LEGAL AND
POLITICAL MATRIX 88 (Seyfi Tashan ed., 1995).
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Alonisos islands, are situated close to the Greek mainland coast.
Therefore, these islands may be regarded as a continuation of the Greek
mainland coast as much as Bozcaada and Gozceada are of Turkey’s
mainland coast. As such, they should be given full effect. Also, Skiros
is relatively close to Evvoia and should have full effect. Lesvos Island is
situated quite close to the Turkish mainland coast. Therefore, Lesvos
should have a median line delimitation with mainland Turkey on the
eastern front, and a full twelve nautical mile territorial sea zone on the
western front.
3. The South Aegean Sea Sector
The south Aegean sector is harder to delimit because the Greek
islands are numerous and scattered across the entire southern region. In
light of this, the best solution would be to maintain the status quo from
Andros Island southward (i.e., allow only a six nautical mile territorial
sea zone for all the islands) so as not to encroach upon the high seas and
allow only Crete to extend the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles.
This could be the best delimitation for both states because it would give
each state the maximum amount of sovereignty within the confines of the
Aegean Sea. There is also the question of how much consideration to
give to the islets and the surrounding islands. There are three
possibilities available: (1) give the islets partial or half effect (or “half
angle”), (2) give the islets full effect, or (3) give the islets no effect.64
Considering the modest size of the islets and their close proximity to the
Turkish coastline, Kos and Kalymnos should have full effect. The
delimitation of Kastellorizo Island, also known as “Meghesti,” poses
some problems with both nations because of its proximity to the Turkish
coastline.65 Giving Kastellorizo full effect in the delimitation would
result in cutting-off the high seas for Turkey on its southwestern
coastline.
4. Alternative Solutions
An alternative to delimiting the Aegean Sea area in three distinct
sections (northern, central, and southern) is to divide the Aegean Sea in
half, down the center, and then delimit the eastern islands and the
western islands, respectively. In this construction, straight baselines may
64. U.N. DIV. OF OCEAN AFFAIRS & LAW OF THE SEA, HANDBOOK OF
DELIMITATION OF MARITIME BOUNDARIES, at 33, U.N. Sales No. E.01.V.2 (2000).
65. SCOVAZZI, supra note 63, at 88.
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be employed to delimit the Cyclades and the islands extending southeast
from Evvoia and Peloponissos because they are “a fringe of islands along
the coast in [Greece’s] immediate vicinity.”66 All of these islands, except
for Ikaria, Phragonisi, Dhenousa, Kinaros, Kalimnos, Antispalata,
Andileousa, Tria Nisia, and Saria, may be given a twelve nautical mile
territorial sea zone and the remaining islands may be given a six nautical
mile territorial sea zone. This would allow navigational passage into the
Mediterranean Sea via a corridor of the high seas. The equitableness of
this proposed drawing may be assessed by using the proportionality test,
which entails comparing the two states’ coastal ratios.
If no island is given effect when the boundaries are drawn then there
is a possibility of enclaving islands situated on the “wrong” side of the
boundary line. Bolukbasi argues that enclaving the Greek islands
situated “on the wrong side of the median line” is the only equitable
solution, as any other solution would prove grossly inequitable.67
Conversely, Bowett argues that “the enclave solution, however equitable
for an isolated group of islands on the wrong side of the median line, is
inappropriate for a situation like the Aegean where the islands are so
numerous and in fact dominate the whole sea area.”68 Given the history
of the two states, the geographic location of the islands, and the current
relationship between Greece and Turkey, it would be best not to enclave
the Greek islands for practical and administrative purposes.
In the interests of justice, a simpler approach is to begin with the
demarcations presented on maps by both Greece and Turkey and to
devise a boundary line that would satisfy both nations. Such a solution
would be political rather than legal because a government’s unilateral
demarcation on the map does not hold legal weight without the
corresponding physical control (“uti possidetis”) over the territory
therein.69
No matter which approach is taken, the result must balance both
parties’ rights. The following illustrates the factors that need to be
balanced against either party’s right to extend its borders. If Turkey
increases its territorial waters to twelve nautical miles in the Aegean Sea,
it would increase its current territorial waters by 1.27%, causing the
boundary line to shift outwards.70 On the other hand, if Greece was to
66.
67.
68.
69.

UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 7(1).
BOLUKBASI, supra note 60, at 506.
SCOVAZZI, supra note 63, at 95.
ENRICO MILANO, UNLAWFUL TERRITORIAL SITUATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
RECONCILING EFFECTIVENESS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY 113 (2006).
70. BOLUKBASI, supra note 60, at 122.
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exercise its right to extend its territorial sea limit to twelve nautical miles
(from the present six), then Greece’s share of the Aegean Sea would
increase by approximately twenty-six percent, causing the boundary line
to shift outwards.71 Moreover, if the territorial seas surrounding the Imia
islets were increased, then Turkey would become nautically semienclosed on its western front and the only method of gaining access to
the Mediterranean Sea from its western coast would be to obtain
permission from Greece to cross Greek territorial waters. Therefore, the
territorial waters surrounding the islands that lie closely to Turkey’s
western border should not be increased beyond the median line between
their coasts and Turkey’s.
Another effect of extending the territorial waters to twelve nautical
miles would be a significant reduction of high seas—from 43.68% to
19.71%.72 Turkey would be disadvantaged by not having access to the
Aegean and Mediterranean Seas; the lack of access would curtail its
trade with other countries and possibly lead to a decline in the Turkish
economy and standard of living in general. If this were the case,
according to Article 17 of UNCLOS, Turkey would still have the right of
innocent passage through Greece’s territorial sea.73
However, it is not possible to extend the territorial waters of the
Imia on its eastern front beyond two nautical miles because there is
approximately a four mile difference between the coast of the Imia and
the Turkish mainland coast. If this were done in negotiations, Turkey
would become nautically semi-enclosed on its western front. However,
being semi-nautically enclosed does not mean that Turkey is completely
disadvantaged because “the coastal state shall have exclusive jurisdiction
. . . with regard to customs, fiscal, health, safety, immigration laws and
regulations,”74 so that Greece would still have to abide by Turkey’s
regulations on these matters even though Greece is very close to
Turkey’s borders.
The disadvantage of extending the territorial waters to twelve
nautical miles is the creation of new straits for international navigation.
According to Articles 34 and 45 of UNCLOS, military aircraft would be
allowed to fly over these straits, which may pose a security issue for
either or both states.75 In any event, Turkey has expressed the sentiment
that if Greece were to extend its territorial waters to twelve nautical
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 125.
Id.
UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 17.
Id. art. 60.
Id. arts. 34, 45.
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miles, then Turkey would consider this casus belli because it would limit
its access to the Mediterranean Sea.76
A possible solution to this predicament is to have a separate
agreement for the extension of the Flight Information Region (FIR) zone
and for the territorial sea zone.77 For example, the status quo may be
maintained for the overflight zone of ten miles,78 while the territorial sea
may be extended to a maximum of ten nautical miles; or, alternatively,
the status quo could be maintained in both the overflight zone and the
current six nautical mile territorial sea zone. Within this overflight zone,
the coastal state has rights of sovereignty, as it would within the
territorial sea; this sovereignty is provided for in Article 1 of UNCLOS.79
In sum, the parties have to strike the right balance in devising their
territorial sea borders to ensure that neither party is disadvantaged by an
extension of the current territorial sea zone which closely corresponds to
the airspace above it.
VI. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE TERRITORIAL
SEA AND THE AIRSPACE ABOVE IT
Generally, the borders of a country’s airspace mirror the land borders
and territorial sea absent an agreement to the contrary.80 The borders of
the airspace will also mirror the borders of the territorial sea, as the latter
is also a zone of sovereignty and essentially an extension of the land of
the coastal state.81 Presently, the territorial waters of Greece extend to
six nautical miles, whereas the airspace over it extends to ten nautical
miles.82 The question posed by this dispute is whether the airspace
regime can be separate from the maritime regime—i.e., can an airspace
boundary differ from the territorial sea boundary so that two different
regimes exist?
76. BOLUKBASI, supra note 60, at 122.
77. See infra Part VI.
78. By the Decree of 1931, Greece extended its overflight zone by four miles beyond
the territorial sea limit of six miles. George Assonitis, The Greek Airspace: The Legality
of a Paradox, 8 U.S. A.F. ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 160 (1997-1998).
79. UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 1.
80. FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 153 (2009).
81. Id.; UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 2.
82. In 1931, Greece claimed a ten nautical mile zone along its coasts for air
navigation and policing its airspace. Martin Pratt & Clive Schofield, The Imia/Kardak
Rocks Dispute in the Aegean Sea, 4 BOUNDARY & SECURITY BULL. 62, 63 (1996). In
1952, the International Civil Aviation Organization ruled that except for a narrow strip of
national airspace along the Turkish coast, the Athens FIR should be responsible for
policing the Aegean airspace. Id.
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FIR is an aviation term used to describe airspace with specific
dimensions, in which a Flight Information Service and an Alerting
Service are provided.83 Greece has the Athens FIR, which presently
extends up to the maritime border with Turkey in the eastern Aegean
Sea.84 The Athens FIR limits were determined during the Regional Air
Navigation Meetings in Paris in 1952, and Geneva in 1958, based on the
outer limits of Greece’s coastal zone and airspace.85 Aeronautical maps
depicting this delimitation were communicated to the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 1955 without third party objections.86
Greece has a “coastal zone of 10 nautical miles serving aviation and air
policing requirements as established by Presidential Decree 6/18 of
September 1931 on the determination of the extent of territorial waters
for aviation and air policing requirements.”87
Turkey has respected and recognized this airspace limit for forty-four
consecutive years prior to contesting it by “violating” the national
airspace (i.e., Turkish fighter planes flying within the ten nautical mile to
Moreover, Turkey has published
six nautical mile airspace).88
aeronautical maps that recognize Greece’s ten nautical mile national
airspace zone.89 However, Turkey has been attempting to unilaterally
change the FIR zone since August 1974, when Turkey unilaterally issued
a notice extending the Istanbul FIR beyond the Greco-Turkish maritime
border in the eastern Aegean Sea.90
Because Turkey did not protest in 1931, or shortly thereafter, it is
arguable that Turkey acquiesced to this delimitation. It may, therefore,
be too late for Turkey to protest. As a result, it may be that a special
international custom has been created, but only a court or tribunal could
determine this with certainty. In the meantime, it is necessary to clarify

83. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICITONARY OF MILTARY AND
ASSOCIATED TERMS 132 (2011), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/
jp1_02.pdf.
84. “Under international law, a state’s sovereignty extends to the airspace superjacent
to its land and territorial sea . . . .” Assonitis, supra note 78, at 163.
85. Greek Territorial Waters - National Airspace, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS—
IN
THE
WORLD,
http://www2.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/
GREECE
Geographic+Regions/South-Eastern+Europe/Turkey/Turkish+claims/Greek+Territorial+Wate
rs+-+National+Airspace/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2012).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. FOTIOS MOUSTAKIS, THE GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONSHIP AND NATO 36 (2003).
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each state’s FIR zone so that neither state finds itself in breach of the
Convention on International Civil Aviation (CICA).91
If Greece extends its territorial waters in the Aegean, Turkey would
lose the airspace over the affected seas and would have to request
permission from the Greek government to fly in Greek national airspace.
The converse would also be true if Turkey were to extend its territorial
waters in the Aegean. Similarly, the reduction of the high seas could
lead to an equal reduction of international airspace. It has been stated
that “[g]eneral international practice as well as the IMO and ICAO
recommendations contained in the International Aeronautical and
Maritime Search and Rescue Manual advocate the adoption of identical
areas for both air and sea search and rescue, to coincide with the limits of
the FIRs.”92
According to the wording of Article 2 of UNCLOS, it would appear
that the outer limits of the territorial sea are the defining factor of the
outer limits of the airspace above.93 The same principle is reiterated in
Articles 1 and 2 of CICA.94 Therefore, the present airspace should be
approximately seven miles, and if and when Greece’s territorial sea limit
is extended, the airspace should be extended to match this regime.
VII. THE CONTINENTAL SHELF AND EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONES
Part VI of UNCLOS, which deals with the continental shelf regime,95
incorporates the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, which was
crystallized in 1958.96 Although the 1958 Convention defines the
characteristics that comprise the continental shelf, UNCLOS builds on
that definition continental shelf by including the rights and duties of the
91. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180
[hereinafter CICA]. Under Article 88 of the CICA, the penalty for non-conformity with
the convention is the suspension of the offending country’s voting power. Id. art. 88.
92. Greek Territorial Waters - National Airspace, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS—
GREECE
IN
THE
WORLD,
http://www2.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/
Geographic+Regions/South-Eastern+Europe/Turkey/Turkish+claims/Greek+Territorial+Wate
rs+-+National+Airspace/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2012).
93. UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 2.
94. See CICA, supra note 91, arts. 1-2. Article 1 states, “[t]he contracting States
recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace
above its territory.” Id. art. 1. Article 2 states, “the territory of a State shall be deemed to
be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty,
protection or mandate of such State.” Id. art. 2.
95. UNCLOS, supra note 29, pt. VI.
96. See Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S.
311.
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coastal state.97 Examples of such rights and duties include sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting natural resources,98 the
right to construct installations after providing notice, and the duty to take
appropriate measures in the safety zones for the conservation of natural
resources.99
Article 76(1) of UNCLOS defines the continental shelf as being
comprised of
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond
its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land
territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a
distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured . . . .100
This definition may not be very helpful in this circumstance because the
Aegean seabed appears to be a natural prolongation of the mainland
coasts of both Greece and Turkey. Therefore, it is useful to determine
which coastal state owns which islands because juridical islands are
entitled to a full suite of maritime zones.
A. The Continental Shelf
The delimitation of the continental shelf covers the entire Aegean
Sea area. Article 83(1) of UNCLOS provides the guiding principle for
delimiting the continental shelf, stating that “the delimitation of the
continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be
effected by agreement on the basis of international law.”101 Special
circumstances must be taken into consideration when delimiting this
zone, including consideration of natural resources found within the
seabed.102
Turkey favors drawing the boundary line in the middle of the Aegean
Sea, equidistant from either the main coastline, without giving effect to
the Greek islands in the middle.103 Although Greece claims that the
continental shelf extends from the Greek mainland coast continuously
97. UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 56.
98. Id.
99. Id. art. 60.
100. Id. art. 76.
101. Id. art. 83(1).
102. Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 41 (June 3).
103. Greek Foreign Ministry, Unilateral Turkish Claims in the Aegean, HELLENIC RES.
NETWORK, http://www.hri.org/MFA/foreign/bilateral/aegeen.htm (last visited Jan. 18,
2012).
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past the Imia islets, the continental shelf may be considered a continuous
natural prolongation of both Greece’s or Turkey’s mainland coast.
However, Greece’s coastal ratio in relation to Turkey’s is approximately
1.54:1 in favor of Greece, which means that Greece’s coast is
approximately one and a half times larger than Turkey’s.104 Because the
main tenet of the law of the sea is that “a State’s entitlement to maritime
areas is measured by reference to its coastline,”105 it is arguable that
Greece would be entitled to larger maritime areas in proportion to its
coastline.
B. Delimitation of the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf
In the 1979 Aegean Sea Case, the ICJ stated that the basic question
in dispute was whether the islands under Greek sovereignty generate a
continental shelf of their own, and whether those islands entitle Greece to
draw a boundary between those islands and the Turkish coast.106 The
issues were posed in the following two questions, which had to be
answered successively: (1) Are the Greek islands entitled to a continental
shelf? And, if so, (2) how should it be delimitated?107 The Aegean
islands (whether Greek or Turkish), which are juridical and able to
generate a continental shelf without encroaching on the maritime zones
of the other party, should have a continental shelf zone delimited to
allow the territorial sovereign to extract the oil and gas which may be
found in the subsoil. However, if the parties agree in negotiations to
ignore the Aegean islands then the boundary line for this zone would
begin from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured.108
Once the boundaries for the territorial waters are devised, the
continental shelf borders may be drawn, but it must be delimited in such
a way so as not to encroach upon the maritime zones of one state to the
detriment of another state, nor to block access to the high seas.109 The
most appropriate method in this continental shelf delimitation would be
to begin by drawing a provisional equidistant line without giving the
islands any effect, then to adjust the line to give effect to those islands
that should have effect, and then finally to readjust the line again to
104. BOLUKBASI, supra note 60, at 521.
105. Shi Yiuong, Maritime Delimitation in the Jurisprudence of the International
Court of Justice, 9 CHINESE J. OF INT’L L. 271, 275 (2010).
106. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), Judgment of December 19, 1978.
107. Id.
108. UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 76(5).
109. SHAW, supra note 23, at 533.
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account for high seas access. For reasons of practicality, it would be
helpful to devise the boundaries in the manner outlined above for the
territorial seas—the northern, central, and southern Aegean sectors—and
then meet the boundary lines before accounting for proportionality and
equitableness.
The continental shelf can be extended in the north Aegean Sea but
not to a maximum 200 nautical miles because it would encroach upon the
high seas. The same may be done in the central Aegean sector if
Skopelos Island and Psara and Anti-Psara Islands are given half-effect
instead of full effect. However, the central Aegean sector is narrower
than the northern and southern sectors, which would result in a shorter
continental shelf.
C. The Exclusive Economic Zone
Article 57 of UNCLOS provides that the EEZ extends to a maximum
breadth of 200 nautical miles “from the baselines from which the breadth
of the territorial sea is measured.”110 Although these are rights that are
prescribed to the coastal state, these rights are sovereign rights, which
are a limited form of sovereignty.111 Moreover, “under the Convention
there is no obligation on a State to claim an EEZ. Nevertheless, coastal
states have in fact exercised their right to make such a claim.”112
Presently, Greece claims a fishery zone with a breadth of six nautical
miles in the entire Aegean Sea region.113
If Greece were to claim an EEZ, then it would have the option of
drawing a boundary line following the guiding principles expressed in
Article 74(1) of UNCLOS, which provides, in part, that the “delimitation
. . . shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law . . . in
order to achieve an equitable solution.”114 Taking into consideration
equitable principles (such as the principle of non-encroachment), and the
fact that the Imia islets will not have a 200 nautical mile continental shelf

110. UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 57.
111. Beginning from a state’s coastline, the further out one goes the less control the
state has in that respective zone. For example, the closest maritime zone to a coastal state
is the territorial waters over which a state has sovereignty, id. art. 2, but UNCLOS also
provides for more limited sovereign rights within the contiguous zone and the EEZ, see,
e.g., id. art. 56.
112. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 56, at 161.
113. BOLUKBASI, supra note 60, at 221-22.
114. UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 74(1).
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due to its proximity to Turkey, a boundary line could be drawn midway
between the Imia islets and the neighboring Turkish island of Cavus.115
The same approach with the same principles can be used to delimit
the EEZ as was used for the continental shelf. Furthermore, both zones
have a maximum 200 nautical mile limit and both are drawn from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.116
D. Dispute Resolution Methods
Boundary delimitation is a mutual activity done with the cooperation
of the states involved.117 Greece and Turkey have been encouraged
several times by other states to refer the matter to the ICJ.118 However,
Turkey has not been very keen to take up this suggestion; instead,
Turkey seems more inclined to resolve the dispute through unilateral
negotiations with Greece.119 Turkey is seemingly unwilling to resort to
the ICJ because: (1) the ICJ oscillates between legal positivism and
judicial activism; (2) the ICJ has a timid attitude in contentious cases,
which is a warning for Turkey that in the Aegean dispute the ICJ is likely
to uphold the present rules of international law and judge in favor of
Greece; (3) national bias influences the ad hoc voting behavior of judges;
(4) Turkey is legally vulnerable; and (5) the consequences of a binding
judgment would be irreversible.120
Greece and Turkey have attempted to settle the dispute peacefully
between themselves through negotiations and by resorting to the ICJ.121
The two countries could also resort to dispute settlement methods such as
mediation, inquiry and reconciliation, arbitration, or perhaps by eliciting
115. Cavus, formerly known as Kato, is situated 2.3 nautical miles from Imia.
116. UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 57.
117. State parties involved in solving their boundary delimitation issues may negotiate
a solution or may agree to submit their dispute to a Court or Tribunal. CONTINENTAL
SHELF LIMITS: THE SCIENTIFIC AND LEGAL INTERFACE 313 (Peter J. Cook & Chris M.
Carleton eds., 2000).
118. The U.S. Congress has also encouraged both Greece and Turkey to seek redress at
the ICJ for any disputes regarding the established boundaries as set forth by the 1923
Lausanne Treaty, the 1932 Convention between Greece and Turkey, and the 1947 Paris
Treaty of Peace. H. R. Res. 199, 11th Cong. (2007).
119. BOLUKBASI, supra note 60, at 79 (“At present, Turkey does not accept the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.”).
120. Kemal Baslar, Two Facets of the Aegean Dispute: de lege lata and ‘de lege
28-9 (2000), available at
ferenda,’ in TURKEY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
http://usakyayinlari.com/pdf/aegean_sea.pdf.
121. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), Application, 1976 I.C.J. 3 (Aug.
10).
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advisory opinions from other international institutions, such as the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Greece and
Turkey also have the option of appealing to the United Nations Security
Council.122
However, of the two states, it is more likely that Turkey would
choose to have the Security Council settle this dispute, given that Turkey
agreed to settle disputes in accordance with Article 33 of the U.N.
Charter in its boundary agreement with Bulgaria.123 Article 34 of the
UN Charter gives the Security Council the authority (by virtue of the
word “may”) to “investigate any dispute, or any situation which may lead
to international friction . . . in order to determine whether the
continuance of the dispute . . . is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace.”124 As a practical matter, it is not likely that Greece
would consider this recourse because the Security Council does not have
the technical experts to delimit the area. Therefore, the best option
would be for the two states to attempt to settle their differences with the
aid of a third party (e.g., a neutral international organization).
As a result of the two countries’ past experience and expertise on law
of the sea issues, the best venue for the solution of this dispute would be
ITLOS. ITLOS is favored by most as the first recourse for settlement of
law of the sea disputes.125 Furthermore, if the case is brought before the
ICJ, it is highly likely that the matter will not be heard for many months,
given the number of cases waiting to be heard by the ICJ presently.
Thus, it is more advantageous for any state to begin proceedings on law
of the sea disputes in ITLOS, where it is far more likely that the case will
be heard and dealt with expeditiously. This efficiency will free other
international bodies to deal with other matters.
Although Turkey has not ratified UNCLOS, the dispute may still be
brought before ITLOS. ITLOS has jurisdiction to hear any dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS, and over all
matters specifically provided for in any other agreement which confers
jurisdiction on ITLOS.126 ITLOS is open to state parties regardless of
whether those states are signatory parties to UNCLOS.127

122. U.N. Charter art. 34.
123. 4 Jonathan I. Charney, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES 2873 (2002).
124. U.N. Charter art. 34.
125. Indeed, ITLOS is listed as the first organization in Article 287(1)(a) of UNCLOS
(before even the ICJ). UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 287(1)(a).
126. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea art. 21, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 561.
127. Id. art. 20.
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Turkey and Greece could then reach an agreement to request an
advisory opinion from ITLOS. This procedure is provided for under
Article 138 of the Rules of ITLOS.128 They may request an advisory
opinion on either the principles to use in delimiting the boundaries
without actually delimiting, or on the types of provisional agreements
that the two states could implement without prejudicing future boundary
delimitations and without prejudice to their sovereign rights. Although
this advisory opinion would not be binding, it could very well be
instrumental in progressing negotiations and hopefully solving the
Aegean dispute. Time is of the essence for both Greece and Turkey, and
it is in the interests of both states to settle this dispute as soon as possible.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Greece and Turkey are two ancient empires whose relationship has
historically been plagued with tension culminating to the present
maritime and airspace disputes in the Aegean Sea and more specifically
to the sovereignty dispute over the Imia islets.
While the Imia islets are relatively small islets and at first seem to be
of no great importance, the issues which need to be negotiated in good
faith between both parties have the potential to open the floodgates for
disputing other claims within the same area over other territories.
Furthermore, the Imia have strategic importance given that they are
situated approximately four miles off the coast of Turkey and close to
other Greek territory.
This Article has provided several possibilities to demarcate the
Aegean Sea maritime boundaries using customary international law
principles, which both Greece and Turkey are subject to. Such
boundaries may be devised by either drawing the borders from the
parties’ respective mainland coastlines and then adjusting the lines to
account for the various islands; to enclaving the islands or dividing the
Aegean Sea in three parts (northern, central, and southern) and
demarcating each section separately before joining the final boundary
lines. The complexity of boundary delimitation is appreciated once
having considered the various principles (e.g., natural prolongation, nonencroachment, etc.) and techniques (e.g., drawing median lines,
accounting for coastal ratios and high seas, etc.) that may be employed in
devising a boundary line. The matter is more complex given that the
entire Aegean Sea contains thousands of islands of various sizes and it
must be determined whether or not they are juridical islands and whether
128. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Rules of the Tribunal art. 138.
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they should be considered in drawing the boundary lines. The parties are
free to continue ongoing negotiations in hopes of leading to a solution
which is acceptable to both sides or they may refer their dispute to an
international tribunal such as ITLOS for a binding decision.
The analysis conducted in this Article is meant to be merely a
starting point in the opening of a meaningful dialogue between the
parties (and perhaps globally) over the numerous possibilities in
boundary delimitation, whether it be for maritime zones, airspace, or
land boundaries. Every dispute is unique, and this one is no exception,
but it is important to set firm land, sea, and air boundaries. As the old
adage declares: “good fences make good neighbors.”

